This paper compares the loans granted to male and female entrepreneurs by a French microfinance institution (MFI). The sample period is split in two: before and after the MFI implemented the French EUR 10,000 regulatory loan-size ceiling. In the first period, the MFI does not co-finance projects with mainstream banks and loan size is gender-insensitive. In the second period, the MFI does co-finance above-ceiling projects with mainstream banks, and we observe a gender gap in loan size. The results suggest that co-financing leads the originally gender-neutral MFI to import disparate treatment from mainstream banks.
Introduction
Female entrepreneurship is advocated as a driving force in economic development.
Access to credit nevertheless remains a challenging barrier to women entrepreneurs.
Two types of gender bias in lending are documented in the literature. The first stems from harsher credit approval (Orser et al., 2000; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Fay and Williams, 1991) . The second relates to credit conditions, including collateral requirements and loan size. 2 We contribute to this stream of the literature by scrutinizing the loan granting process of a French microfinance institution (MFI). In
France, women account for 47% of the workforce but only 30% of entrepreneurs (Brana, 2013) . Hence, there are grounds to suspect that women find it harder than men to set up a business.
In Europe, discrimination in lending is difficult to test directly because banks are not required to release individual data. To get around this issue, we used an indirect identification strategy, which is to observe the impact of the banks' loan approval process on applicants to an MFI. This is made possible by the French regulatory context. In France, licensed MFIs, i.e. MFIs that are allowed to finance their activity through borrowing, are subject to a strict EUR 10,000 loan-size ceiling. 3 However, a significant percentage of entrepreneurs targeted by French MFIs 4 have business projects that require above-ceiling loans. To apply for microcredit, these entrepreneurs have to secure co-financing from a mainstream bank beforehand. In this context, the gender and project characteristics of microcredit applicants with above-ceiling projects partly reveal how banks treat their female applicants.
2 Riding and Swift (1990) , Coleman (2000) , and Bellucci et al. (2010) find that collateral requirements are gender-related in Canada, the UK, and Italy, respectively. Alesina et al. (2013) and Agier and Szafarz (2013a) show that female micro-entrepreneurs receive smaller loans than male ones, in Italy and Brazil, respectively. 3 This ceiling is significantly lower than the EUR 25,000 threshold recommended by the European Commission. 4 Most of them are unemployed people aiming at self-employment.
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In France, as elsewhere, commercial banks remain the main providers of smallbusiness finance (Berger and Udell, 2002) . MFIs are new players in the field. By imposing a low loan-size ceiling on MFIs, the French regulator sought to preserve the banks' prerogative to provide small businesses with loans above EUR 10,000 (Brabant et al., 2009) . In practice, however, the French regulation has led to project co-financing by banks and MFIs. This outcome can be viewed as a somewhat unexpected byproduct 5 of the particularly low loan-size ceiling enforced by the French Government. 6 It can nevertheless be rationalized by the fact that co-financing is profitable to credit providers through information sharing (Bennardo et al., 2009) . While the literature cites evidence of co-financing schemes linking formal and informal institutions in developing countries (Jain, 1999; Andersen and Malchow-Moller, 2006, Degryse et al., 2013) , cofinancing between banks and MFIs in developed countries has not been reported so far.
This might indicate that the French situation is fairly exceptional. Alternatively, one could argue that the microfinance industry in developed countries is still in its infancy and has not yet fully exploited market opportunities.
Both banks and MFIs can gain from co-financing. Firstly, co-financing projects with MFIs offers banks easy access to new market segments with limited risk.
Secondly, ceiling-constrained MFIs that co-finance projects with banks can continue to attract entrepreneurs with above-ceiling projects while free-riding on banks' screening processes. At the same time, the possibility of co-financing means that the MFIs' pools of applicants become at least partly shaped by banks. We use this feature as an identification strategy for scrutinizing the banks' attitude toward female loan applicants.
5 MFIs and banks have different statuses. MFIs are subsidized institutions maximizing social performance within a budget constraint, while banks are driven by profit maximization (Aubert et al., 2009 ). However, Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) provide evidence that the social mission varies across MFIs. 6 In the United States, the loan-size ceiling for microcredit is USD 50,000. The European Union (EU) recommends the use of a EUR 25,000 ceiling, but member states remain free to set their own rules. Some countries (Romania, Italy) have adopted the EU recommendation, while others, like Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, and the UK, allow MFIs to grant loans exceeding EUR 25,000. France is the only EU member to impose a ceiling lower than the EU recommendation.
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More precisely, we exploit a natural experiment, since we observe the full loan-granting process of an MFI before and after the introduction of the loan-size ceiling, i.e. before and after the emergence of co-financing.
Based on a double partial least squares estimation, our results confirm that the introduction of the loan-size ceiling changed the MFI's loan allocation dramatically.
Specifically, the MFI moved from a gender-neutral allocation to a gender-biased one.
Before the introduction of the ceiling, the MFI granted loans without bank co-financing, and we detect no gender gap in loan size. After the ceiling was introduced, the MFI started co-financing above-ceiling projects with mainstream banks and women received significantly smaller loans than men, all other things being equal. Our findings suggest that co-financing has led the originally gender-neutral MFI to import disparate treatment from mainstream banks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data. The econometric model in Section 3 pinpoints the relationship between gender, loan size and loan approval. In section 4 we discuss the results by period. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Individual data were hand collected on the applicants and borrowers of a French MFI such, it was required to finance its activity by means of subsidies only, which restricted its growth. In April 2009, the NGO changed its status to a regulated MFI in order to gain access to funds at preferential rates. Since then, the MFI has been subject to the EUR 10,000 loan-size ceiling. Although the change of status enabled the MFI to grow significantly, 7 the institution has preserved its social purpose.
Since it was founded, the MFI has used the typical individual microcredit lending methodology: it charges the same interest rate to all borrowers. Over the sample period, the interest rate changed slightly due to market conditions, but remained between 4%
and 5% p.a., which is remarkably low given the risks involved in start-up financing.
Loans are to be repaid in monthly instalments. The average loan duration is 51 months.
Loan applications are examined by a loan officer, while the credit committee has the final say on loan approval. Typically, the decision is binary: the credit committee either approves or denies the granting of a loan of the size requested by the applicant. In practice, the main difference between the two periods is the emergence of cofinancing. Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the change that took place in May 2009. In the first period ( Fig. 1) , the MFI financed projects up to EUR 40,000 9 without any bank intervention. In the second period (Fig. 2) , the EUR 10,000 loan-size ceiling was introduced. The holders of below-and above-ceiling projects follow distinct paths. For 7 In 2010, the MFI opened two new branches and its staff passed from six to ten employees. 8 In only 7.6% of our sample is the granted loan size smaller than the demanded one. This way of doing departs from the lending methodology adopted by many MFIs, which use loan size as a decision variable (Agier and Szafarz, 2013b) . 9 This threshold was hardly binding.
7
holders of below-ceiling projects, there was no change. They retained the right to apply to the MFI directly. In contrast, holders of above-ceiling projects were required to secure a partial bank loan before applying to the MFI. Their best interests dictate them to apply to a bank for the portion of their desired loan that exceeds EUR 10,000. Doing so has two advantages. First, it maximizes their chances of obtaining a loan from the bank. Second, it minimizes the financial burden of their debt since the MFI charges an interest rate that is typically lower than that of mainstream banks. Projects denied by banks may be either abandoned or downsized to an amount that does not require bank financing. However, downsizing can strongly compromise the implementation of the investment project. Therefore, we conjecture that projects that require loans well above EUR 10,000 that are denied by banks are mostly abandoned. In any case, we do not observe the outcomes of the application process to banks. We only observe the occurrence of bank loans among MFI applicants as well as the size of these loans and their interest rates. Table 4 in Appendix 1. The proportion of female applicants remains similar over the two periods: 38% in the first period, 41% in the second. For the first period, the t-tests in Table 1 do not detect any significant differences in financial characteristics between male and female applicants. However, in the second period, women apply for smaller loans than men from the MFI, and receive even smaller ones. Interestingly, we detect no gender gap in the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan. In contrast, there is a huge gender gap in the size of the bank-supplied loans. Women also tend to undertake smaller projects than men, probably because the loans they manage to obtain from banks are on average 28% lower than those obtained by men (EUR 45,940 against EUR 33,050). The average gap (EUR 12,890) represents 47% of the average project size of female applicants (EUR 27,590). Table 4 in Appendix A shows that the sizes of the loans granted to women by the MFI exhibit similar features. This gender-specific credit rationing is in line with previous evidence by Agier and Szafarz (2013a) , who detect a "glass-ceiling effect" at a Brazilian MFI, meaning that loan approval is not discriminatory, but women with ambitious projects tend to receive smaller loans than men. Presumably, the fact that gender-related disparate treatment in microcredit affects credit conditions rather than loan approval is linked to the microfinance tradition of serving female borrowers (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010) .
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Table 1 exhibits large gender disparities in business activities. Strikingly, the share of female projects in the food and accommodation sector dropped in the second period. This drop could be related to the economic crisis that negatively affected the attractiveness of the sector. Overall, the descriptive statistics point to the necessity of controlling for business sector in the regression analysis. Table 1 also highlights the change in applicants' individual characteristics. In the first period, female applicants are younger than men and more often single. These significant differences disappear in the second period. Concurrently, other differences emerge. The second-period female applicants have more dependent children than their male counterparts, exhibit higher education levels, and belong to wealthier households.
The introduction of the loan-size ceiling seems to have squeezed out young, single, and poorer female applicants.
Gender aside, Table 1 corroborates the finding that the MFI's pool of applicants changed dramatically in the second period. Practically non-existent in the first period, the occurrence of holders of bank loans among applicants jumped to 27%. Meanwhile, the loan approval rate increased. This increase was probably driven by free-riding on bank screening: the MFI partly relies on the bank's approval decision. Importantly, the average size of the projects submitted to the MFI seems insensitive to the introduction of the ceiling, remaining around EUR 30,000. This might indicate that there is a critical project size for entrepreneurial projects in France. halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013 10 Note that bank loans are totally absent for actual borrowers during the period without ceiling (see Table  4 in Appendix A).
11 3 Regression Analysis: Methods
Our aim was to estimate the period-specific impacts of the applicant's gender on both loan approval and loan size. We proceeded as follows. For each period separately, we ran a probit regression for approval and an OLS regression for loan size. In both cases, the explained variables of interest include gender (F, which takes value 1 if the applicant is female and 0 otherwise) and project size (PS, in EUR). In addition, for the second-period estimations, we include the pre-approved bank loan size, if any (BL, in EUR, which is equal to zero if there is no bank loan). The control variables grouped in vector X include the applicants' business characteristics (start-up, business sector) and individual characteristics (marital status, age, number of dependent children, education level and household income).
The probit model for loan approval reads:
where Фሺ. ሻ is the normal cumulative distribution function, ‫ܣ‬ is the dummy, which has a value of 1 when applicant i receives a loan and 0 otherwise. Variable BL in the righthand side of Eq. (1) is absent from first-period estimations.
The OLS model for loan size is given by:
where ‫ܵܮ‬ is the size of loan i. Variable BL in the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is absent from first-period estimations.
Eq. (1) is estimated by using the full sample of applicants while Eq. (2) is estimated on the smaller sample consisting of actual borrowers only. Given that the MFI typically grants the loan size requested by the successful applicants, loan approval or halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013
12 denial represents the only decision variable in the hands of the MFI. The subsequent sizes of approved loans are straightforward outcomes of the loan allocation process.
The estimation of Eqs (1) and (2) may be affected by multicollinearity, however.
In both periods, the project size depends on the applicant's characteristics, possibly including gender. In addition, in the second period project holders with a bank loan have necessarily passed the bank's screening process. The size of their bank loan thus depends on both their project size and characteristics. To address this double source of potential multicollinearity, we used the partial least squares (PLS) estimation strategy suggested by Agier and Szafarz (2013a) . At the MFI level, this approach allowed us to disentangle the impacts of demand-side and supply-side factors on both loan approval and loan size.
Specifically, for the first period, we used a single PLS estimation, while for the second period we performed a double PLS (2PLS) estimation. For both periods, the first step involved regressing project size on both gender and control variables in the following way:
where RPS is the residual project size net of the influence of applicant's characteristics.
For the first period, the final steps involved the estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2),
where PS i is replaced by RPS i obtained from (3):
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For the second period, we applied a second PLS estimation. The size of the bank loan was regressed on gender, residual project size, and the controls. Taking into account Eq. (3), we obtained:
where RPL i is the residual bank loan size net of the influence of all the other explanatory variables, including gender and project size. The estimation of Eq. (6) in itself reveals information on the screening process at banks. The results should be interpreted with care, however, since they may be affected by a selection bias. Indeed, we only observe the bank loans of successful applicants who subsequently applied to the MFI.
In the last step of the second-period estimations, double PLS (2PLS) estimations for the approval rate and the loan size were performed by replacing PS i by RPS i (from (3)) and BL i by RBL i (from (6)) in both Eqs.
(1) and (2). Our equations of interest became:
The structure of the λ and θ loadings is provided in Appendix B. The next section discusses the estimation results.
Regression Results

First-Period Estimations
In the first period (April 2008 -April 2009 , the MFI has the legal status of an unregulated NGO. It is not subject to the EUR 10,000 loan-size ceiling, and there is no halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013
14 co-financing with banks. Table 2 summarizes the results of the first-period estimations for the demand side (project size), the supply side (approval rate), and the outcome (granted loan size). The estimation methodology follows the lines set out in Section 3. It enables us to trace the impacts of gender and other characteristics throughout the MFI's loan allocation process. Column (A) reports the loadings of the OLS regression for the project size (Eq.
(3)). We do not detect any significant impact of gender on project size, suggesting that women did not undertake smaller projects than men. The characteristics that exhibit a significantly positive influence on project size are: education level and some business sectors. A significant influence is observed for three sectors: trade, services, and arts and entertainment.
Column (B) gives the results for the probit/PLS estimation (Eq. (4)). It reports the marginal effects at the mean for the probability of approval. Gender is not significant.
Remarkably, the residual project size has a significantly negative impact on loan approval. This means that, all other things being equal, the unconstrained MFI shows a preference for financing smaller projects, which is in line with its social purpose of serving poor borrowers. Among the other explanatory variables, only long-term unemployment stands out with a significantly negative impact on the probability of loan approval. Table 2 uses PLS estimation (Eq. (5)) for loan size. Again, gender is not significant.
Column (C) in
11 As expected, the residual project size has a significantly positive impact on loan size. Several control variables are significant. Start-up, trade, services, construction, arts and entertainment sectors, unemployed for more than 6 months, single dummy and age negatively impact the size of the microcredit. The loading of education has a positive sign. However, all these control variables become significant in the PLS estimation, whereas in the OLS model (Eq. (2)) they were not (we present the results for the OLS model in the Appendix C, Table 5 , column (B)). This finding suggests that the relationships we find between loan size and the control variables are the result of the link between these variables and project size. More specifically, among selected applicants, start-ups, businesses in trade, services, construction and art sectors, longterm unemployed, single and older individuals receive less from the MFI because they undertake smaller projects rather than being directly attributable to the MFI's selection process.
Overall, we conclude that there is no evidence of discrimination against female applicants during the first period, i.e. when the MFI granted loans without bank cofinancing.
Second-Period Estimations
In the second period (May 2009-June 2012), the MFI is regulated and subject to the EUR 10,000 loan-size ceiling. This period is characterized by the emergence of cofinancing by the MFI and mainstream banks. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 provide evidence that the regime shift that occurred in May 2009 affected the pool of applicants considerably. The regression analysis in Table 3 confirms the preliminary findings. In addition, using the 2PLS estimation set out in Section 3 allows us to stress the impact of bank loans on the MFI's loan allocation process. Table 3 has four columns: Columns (A), (C) and (D) are similar to those featured in Table 2 . The new column (B) explains the size of the bank loan. Naturally, the model in column (B) is estimated on the limited sample of MFI applicants who managed to secure a bank loan.
Column (A) in Table 3 presents the OLS regression for project size. The results
show that, in comparison with the first-period estimation, the situation of women worsened. The implementation of the loan-size ceiling is concomitant with women applying for smaller projects than their male counterparts. In economic terms, the gender gap in project size is considerable since it amounts to EUR 8,922. Importantly,
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this gap is purely demand-side and can hardly be attributed to the MFI. Plausibly, it is attributable to the banks to which entrepreneurs apply for co-financing. Indeed, holders of large projects must secure a bank loan before applying for microcredit. Given that we only observe applicants who either apply for below-ceiling loans or pass the banks' screening process, the facts are consistent with harsher loan granting by banks.
Moreover, the first-period estimation results (column (A) in Table 2 ) corroborate the finding that the female applicants to the MFI do not spontaneously request smaller loans than men with similar characteristics. A competing scenario is self-selection that may result from women downsizing their projects in response to the new loan-size ceiling without even trying to obtain co-financing. However, this alternative scenario is also consistent with disparate gender treatment by banks. Spontaneous project downsizing could indeed be a rational response from women entrepreneurs to expected rejection by the banks. To avert an expected unsuccessful application, women would thus opt for second-best solutions in the form of smaller business projects.
Gender aside, column (A) reveals that the profiles of MFI's applicants changed in the second period. Specifically, the holders of larger projects have different characteristics than their first-period counterparts. In the second period, larger applications emanate from the food and accommodation sector and from households with larger incomes, while the impact of education on project size diminishes. In the second period, both the number of dependent children and being unemployed have significantly negative impacts on project size. In contrast, household income gains a significantly positive impact. Arguably, these changes could be linked to the disappearance and/or the downsizing of projects rejected by the banks.
halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013 In column (B), PLS estimation is used to explain the size of the bank loan. The sample is smaller since only 225 MFI applicants out of 799 secured a bank loan. The loading of the gender dummy is large and highly significant. On average, women's bank loans are EUR 6,774 lower than those of men with similar characteristics. Admittedly, we do not observe banks' loan granting process, so the fact that women come to the halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013
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MFI with smaller bank loans does not directly prove that banks exercise gender discrimination. Still, put together, the project size regression in column (A) and the bank loan regression in column (B) raise serious concerns about the way female applicants are treated by mainstream banks. The presence of significantly negative gender impacts in both equations is consistent with the banks being at least partly responsible for the demand-side gender gap that appeared after the introduction of the loan-size ceiling.
Moreover, column (B) shows that the correlation between project size and bank loan size is high and significant. This correlation explains the strong match (R-squared is equal to 92.4%). To assess the plausibility of the bank-related explanation for the sudden appearance of a gender gap in demand for micro-loans, Appendix D shows two additional estimations explaining the amount requested from the MFI. First, in the OLS estimation (column (A) in Table 6 ) the female dummy is insignificant. Second, the 2PLS estimation (column (B) in Table 6 ) shows that accounting for the links between both project size and bank loan and other covariates renders the loading of the female dummy significantly negative. This result reinforces the argument that the negative impact of gender on the size of the requested microloans is bank-driven.
Together, columns (A) and (B) describe demand to the MFI. Although the samples are different, the project-size and bank-loan equations deliver a consistent picture. This is comforting since the causality between project size and bank loan is tricky. Women-owned businesses and start-ups exhibit smaller applications and get smaller loans from banks while both project size and bank loans are the largest for the food and accommodation sector. Still, a few minor differences are worth mentioning. In particular, both being single and being older than average reduce the size of the granted bank loan, which seems contradictory. Actually, the loading associated with age is small and age has a low dispersion. The average age of the holders of a bank loan is 38 and halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013 20 the standard error is low (0.61). Therefore, the significance of the impact of age on loan size could be due to a few outliers.
Columns (C) and (D) are devoted to supply-side estimations. The probit/2PLS estimation in column (C) investigates the MFI's approval decisions. The results show that the female dummy is insignificant. This suggests that, as in the first period, the MFI applies a gender-blind approval process. However, in contrast with the first period, the ceiling-constrained MFI exhibits a preference for larger projects. Consistently with this preference, the MFI views a bank loan as an asset. The attraction of co-financing, as opposed to single-financing, supports the free-riding hypothesis that the MFI finds it profitable to build on the banks' screening process (Cozarenco and Szafarz 2013) .
Noticeably, a start-up status, being single, and the number of dependent children have negative impacts on the probability of receiving a microloan, whereas these effects were absent in the first period.
Column (D) features the 2PLS estimation results for loan size. The estimation is performed on the sample of actual borrowers. Importantly, loan size should be regarded as an outcome variable rather than a decision variable. Indeed, the MFI typically makes an approval/denial decision, and subsequently grants the requested amounts to successful applicants. In contrast with most MFIs active in developing countries, the French institution does not ration the credit provided to its selected borrowers. This lending strategy has remained unaffected by the regulatory regime shift.
In column (D) the female dummy has a negative loading, significant at the 1% level. Thus, when the dependence of project size and bank loan on the borrowers' characteristics are accounted for, it appears that second-period female applicants receive smaller loans than their male counterparts. Female borrowers are thus worse off under the loan-size ceiling regime. Moreover, in the OLS model (Column (D), Table 5 in halshs-00874448, version 1 -17 Oct 2013 21 Appendix C), the gender dummy has a lower impact, which is significant at the 10% level only. This suggests that, in the second period, women get smaller loans from the MFI than in the first period, but mainly because they undertake smaller projects and/or obtain smaller loans from banks. The disparate treatment, if any, is not directly caused by the MFI. Rather, it is already present in the demand function, which emanates from the second-period applicants. Possibly, the MFI tries to correct bank-driven biases, but in a gender-neutral way. The higher the residual bank loan, the lower the loan size.
However, although significant, the estimated coefficient is small. It is far from sufficient to neutralize the gendered impact of co-financing on loan size. In sum, the second-period estimation of the approval rate confirms the first-period results showing that the MFI makes gender-neutral decisions. However, the secondperiod loan size regression points to the possibility that the MFI's interest in cofinancing leads it to grant smaller loans to female borrowers. Rather than correcting the gender gap in loan size imported from banks, the MFI reinforces it. Importantly though, this move seems involuntary, since the only real decision variable of the MFI is loan approval/denial, and this variable is not affected by the borrower's gender. Moreover, the first-period estimations show that the gender gap in loan size was absent before the introduction of the loan-size ceiling and the subsequent emergence of co-financing.
Overall, the loan-size ceiling appears to have a detrimental impact on the size of the loans granted to female borrowers. Women are known to start businesses with smaller external finance than men (Coleman, 2000) . However, the evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains controversial. According to Carter et al. (2007) , many differences in the bank loans of male and female entrepreneurs are attributable to structural dissimilarities. Therefore, any econometric analysis that finds gender discrimination is suspected of having missed relevant variables. In this paper, we get around this issue by using an indirect identification technique and by taking advantage of a natural experiment. We detect gender biases in banks' loan allocation by observing their impact on the applicants of an MFI which proved to be gender-neutral before introducing co-financing with mainstream banks. The main limitation of our approach is the impossibility of estimating-and subsequently correcting for-a self-selection bias that might have appeared in the pool of microcredit applicants after the loan-size ceiling came into force.
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Further research could build on our innovative methodology and investigate whether biases also exist in bank lending against other discriminated-against segments of the population. Access to MFIs' databases could facilitate checking whether banks exert disparate treatment based on race and ethnicity. The literature finds that non-white applicants can indeed be penalised by discrimination in lending (Storey, 2004; Blanchard et al., 2008; Blanchflower et al., 2003) .
The success of the worldwide microcredit industry is at least partly attributable to its focus on poor female entrepreneurs who desperately need funds to launch their businesses (Garikipati, 2008; Guérin, 2011) . It is therefore important to avoid introducing regulations that can counteract the women's empowerment efforts of MFIs.
If the aim of the French regulator is to segment the credit market, then co-financing arrangements should be prohibited. However, ruling out co-financing while maintaining a very low loan-size ceiling could compromise the sustainability of the microfinance industry, especially if subsidies dry up (Hudon and Traca, 2011) . In any case, imposing on MFIs a loan-size ceiling that is too low to meet the needs of micro-businesses is counterproductive. Evidently, the EUR 25,000 ceiling suggested by the EU makes more sense than the EUR 10,000 introduced in France. 
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